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Abstract
Security games are an example of a successful real-world ap-
plication of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness
of the defender and the attacker in security games using the
principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and
complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness
in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the
asymmetry of information in security games.
Introduction
In this paper we study the properties of blameworthiness
in security games (von Stackelberg 1934). Security games
are used for canine airport patrol (Pita et al. 2008; Jain et
al. 2010), airport passenger screening (Brown et al. 2016),
protecting endangered animals and fish stocks (Fang, Stone,
and Tambe 2015), U.S. Coast Guard port patrol (Sinha et al.
2018; An, Tambe, and Sinha 2016), and randomized deploy-
ment of U.S. air marshals (Sinha et al. 2018).
Defender \Attacker Terminal 1 Terminal 2
Terminal 1 20 120
Terminal 2 200 16
Figure 1: Expected Human Losses in Security Game G1.
As an example, consider a security game G1 in which a
defender is trying to protect two terminals in an airport from
an attacker. Due to limited resources, the defender can patrol
only one terminal at a given time. If the defender chooses to
patrol Terminal 1 and the attacker chooses to attack Terminal
2, then the human losses at Terminal 2 are estimated at 120,
see Figure 1. However, if the defender chooses to patrol Ter-
minal 2 while the attacker still chooses to attack Terminal 2,
then the expected number of the human losses at Terminal
2 is only 16, see Figure 1. Generally speaking, the goal of
the defender is to minimize human losses, while the goal of
the attacker is to maximize them. However, the utility func-
tions in security games usually take into account not only
the human losses, but also the cost to protect and to attack
the target to the defender and the attacker respectively. Such
a cost has to be converted to human lives using some factor,
possibly different for the defender and the attacker. In game
G1, we assume that the cost of defending Terminal 1 and
Terminal 2 is 8 and 4 respectively, while the cost of attack-
ing these terminals is 12 and 8 respectively, see Figure 2. As
a result, for example, if the defender chooses to patrol Ter-
minal 1 and the attacker chooses to attack Terminal 2, then
the payoff of the defender is −120 − 8 = −128 and the
payoff of the attacker is 120− 8 = 112, see Figure 2.
Defender \Attacker Terminal 1 Terminal 2
(cost 12) (cost 8)
Terminal 1 (cost 8) −28, 8 −128, 112
Terminal 2 (cost 4) −204, 188 −20, 8
Figure 2: Utility Functions in Security Game G1.
In real world examples of security games, the defender
usually employs mixed strategies. For example, if the de-
fender is using a strategy 75/25, then he will spend 75% of
the time in Terminal 1 and 25% of the time in Terminal 2. In
practice, each morning the defender might get a randomly
generated timetable that specifies at which terminal the de-
fender should be at each time slot during the day (Jain et al.
2010). The distinctive feature of security games compared
to strategic games is the asymmetry of information between
the players: the attacker knows the strategy employed by the
defender but not vice versa. For example, while planning the
attack, the attacker might visit the airport multiple times and
observe that the defender spends 75% of the time in Termi-
nal 1 and 25% of the time in Terminal 2. Thus, the attacker
will know the mixed strategy used by the defender, but she
will not know the location of the defender at the moment she
plans to arrive at the airport on the day of the attack.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that in game G1
the defender must choose between only three given mixed
strategies: 75/25, 50/50, and 25/75. Then, game G1 can
be described as an extensive form game depicted in Fig-
ure 3. The payoffs in this figure represent expected values of
the utility functions. For example, suppose that the defender
chooses the mixed strategy 75/25 and the attacker chooses
to attack Terminal 1. The pair (75/25, T1) is called an ac-
tion profile of game G1. Under this action profile, the pay-
offs of the defender and the attacker are −28 and 8, respec-
tively, with probability 75%, and they are −204 and 188,
respectively, with probability 25%, see Figure 2. Thus, the
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50/5075/25 25/75
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2
-116,98 -74,60-72,53 -101,86 -160,143 -47,34
Figure 3: Security Game G1 in Extensive Form.
expected payoff (or just “payoff”) of the defender is
75%× (−28) + 25%× (−204) = −21− 51 = −72
and of the attacker is
75%× 8 + 25%× 188 = 6 + 47 = 53.
Suppose that the defender chooses a strategy 50/50 and the
attacker decides to target Terminal 2. Then, the attacker’s
payoff is 60, see Figure 3. We write this as
(50/50, T2)  “The attacker’s payoff is 60.”.
The attacker’s mastermind might find this to be the at-
tacker’s fault and blame the attacker for the payoff not being
at least 98. We capture the attacker’s blameworthiness by
(50/50, T2)  A(“The attacker’s payoff is less than 98.”),
where the blameworthiness modality Aϕ stands for “the
attacker is blamable for ϕ”. We define the blameworthi-
ness using the well known Frankfurt’s principle1 of alter-
native possibilities: an agent is blamable for ϕ if ϕ is true
and the agent could have prevented ϕ (Frankfurt 1969;
Widerker 2017). In our case, the attacker, after learning that
the defender’s strategy is 50/50, could have targeted Ter-
minal 1, which would increase her payoff to 98, see Fig-
ure 3. The principle of alternative possibilities, sometimes
referred to as “counterfactual possibility” (Cushman 2015),
is also used to define causality (Lewis 2013; Halpern 2016;
Batusov and Soutchanski 2018).
Next, assume that the defender still chooses the strategy
50/50, but the attacker decided to target Terminal 1. Un-
der this action profile, the payoff of the attacker is 98, see
Figure 3. Although the payoff is less than the attacker’s pay-
off of 143 under the action profile (25/75, T1), the attacker
cannot be blamed for this:
(50/50, T1)¬A(“The attacker’s payoff is less than 143.”),
because the attacker had no action in game G1 to guarantee
her payoff to be at least 143. At the same time, under the
action profile (25/75, T1), the defender is blameable for his
payoff being less than −101:
(50/50, T1)D(“The defender’s payoff is less than −101.”),
1This principle has many limitations that (Frankfurt 1969) dis-
cusses; for example, when a person is coerced into something.
because the defender could have guaranteed his payoff to be
at least −101 by choosing mixed strategy 75/25, see Fig-
ure 3. Following the principle of alternative possibilities,
the blameworthiness modality Dϕ stands for “statement ϕ
is true and the defender had a strategy to prevent it”.
In addition to the blameworthiness modalities A and D,
in this paper we also consider an auxiliary necessity modal-
ity N. Statement Nϕ stands for “ϕ is true under each action
profile of the given security game”. For example,
(50/50, T1)  N(“The defender’s payoff is negative.”),
because in game G1 the defender’s payoff is always nega-
tive. Surprisingly, as we show in Lemma 1, modality D can
be expressed through modalities A and N:
Dϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ ¬N(¬ϕ→ A¬ϕ).
At the same time, we believe that modality A cannot be
expressed through modalities D and N, which reflects the
asymmetric nature of security games.
In this paper we give a sound and complete axiomatiza-
tion of the interplay between modalities A and N in security
games. This work is related to our paper on blameworthi-
ness in strategic games (2019). They proposed a sound and
complete axiomatization of the interplay between the neces-
sity modality N and the coalition blameworthiness modality
BC in strategic games. Their definition of the blameworthi-
ness is also based on the principle of alternative possibili-
ties. Namely, BCϕ stands for “statement ϕ is true and coali-
tion (a set of agents) C had a strategy to prevent it”. Thus,
our modalities Aϕ and Dϕ correspond to their modalities
B{attacker}ϕ and B{defender}ϕ. In spite of this syntactic simi-
larity between their and our works, the resulting axiomatic
systems are quite different, which comes from the semantic
difference between strategic games and security games. In
security games, the attacker knows the defender’s strategy
while in a similar strategic game she would not. There are
three aspects in which this work is different from (Naumov
and Tao 2019):
1. As stated above, in security games modality D is express-
ible through modalities A and N, while in strategic games
modality B{defender} is not expressible through modalities
B{attacker} and N.
2. Two of our core axioms for modality A, the Conjunction
axiom and the No Blame axiom capture the asymmetry
of information in security games. They are not sound in
strategic games. The Fairness axiom from (Naumov and
Tao 2019) is not sound in our setting. We further discuss
this in the Axioms section.
3. The proof of the completeness is using a completely dif-
ferent construction from the one used in (Naumov and Tao
2019). This is discussed in section Completeness.
Syntax and Semantics
In this paper we consider a fixed set of propositional vari-
ables Prop. The language Φ of our logical system is defined
by the grammar: ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | Nϕ | Aϕ.
As usual, we assume that connectives ∧, ∨, and ↔ are
defined through connectives → and ¬ in the standard way.
Next, we formally define security games (or just “games”).
Definition 1 A game is a tuple (D, {Ad}d∈D, pi), where
1. set D is a set of actions of the defender,
2. non-empty set Ad is a set of actions of the attacker in
response to the action d ∈ D of the defender,
3. valuation pi(p) of a propositional variable p is an arbi-
trary set of pairs (d, a) such that d ∈ D and a ∈ Ad.
In game G1 from the introduction, the set of actions D of
the defender is a three-element set {75/25, 50/50, 25/75}.
For each action d ∈ D of the defender in this game, the
set of responses Ad is the same two-element set {T1, T2}.
Informally, pi(p) describes the set of action profiles (d, a)
under which statement p is true.
The next definition is the core definition of our paper. Its
item 5 defines blameworthiness of the attacker in security
games using the principle of alternative possibilities (Frank-
furt 1969; Widerker 2017): the attacker is blamable for state-
ment ϕ under action profile (d, a) if ϕ is true under this pro-
file and the attacker had an opportunity to prevent ϕ.
Definition 2 For any action d ∈ D of the defender and
any response action a ∈ Ad of the attacker in a game
(D, {Ad}d∈D, pi) and any formula ϕ ∈ Φ, the satisfiabil-
ity relation (d, a)  ϕ is defined recursively as follows:
1. (d, a)  p if (d, a) ∈ pi(p), where p ∈ Prop,
2. (d, a)  ¬ϕ if (d, a) 1 ϕ,
3. (d, a)  ϕ→ ψ if (d, a) 1 ϕ or (d, a)  ψ,
4. (d, a)  Nϕ if (d′, a′)  ϕ for each action d′ ∈ D of
the defender and each response action a′ ∈ Ad′ of the
attacker,
5. (d, a)  Aϕ if (d, a)  ϕ and there is a response action
a′ ∈ Ad of the attacker such that (d, a′) 1 ϕ.
As defined above, language Φ includes the attacker’s
blameworthiness modality A, but does not include the de-
fender’s blameworthiness modality D. If modality D is
added to language Φ to form language Φ+, then Definition 2
would need to be extended by an additional item:
6. (d, a)  Dϕ if (d, a)  ϕ and there is an action d′ ∈ D of
the defender such that for each response action a′ ∈ Ad′
of the attacker, (d′, a′) 1 ϕ.
As mentioned in the introduction, we do not include modal-
ity D into language Φ because it is expressible through
modalities A and N. Indeed, the following lemma holds for
any formula ϕ ∈ Φ+:
Lemma 1 (d, a)  Dϕ iff (d, a)  ϕ ∧ ¬N(¬ϕ→ A¬ϕ).
PROOF. (⇒) : Suppose that (d, a) 1 ϕ ∧ ¬N(¬ϕ→ A¬ϕ).
Thus, either (d, a) 1 ϕ or (d, a)  N(¬ϕ → A¬ϕ). In the
first case, (d, a) 1 Dϕ by item 6 above.
Next assume that (d, a)  N(¬ϕ → A¬ϕ). By item 6,
to prove (d, a) 1 Dϕ, it suffices to show that for any action
d′ ∈ D of the defender there is a response action a′ ∈ Ad′
of the attacker, such that (d′, a′)  ϕ. Indeed, consider any
action d′ ∈ D of the defender. By Definition 1, setAd′ is not
empty. Let a1 ∈ Ad′ be an arbitrary response action of the
attacker on action d′. Assumption (d, a)  N(¬ϕ→ A¬ϕ),
by item 4 of Definition 2, implies (d′, a1)  ¬ϕ → A¬ϕ.
We consider the following two cases separately:
Case I: (d′, a1)  ϕ. Then, choose the response action a′ to
be a1 to have (d′, a′)  ϕ.
Case II: (d′, a1) 1 ϕ. Thus, (d′, a1)  ¬ϕ by item 2 of
Definition 2. Hence, (d′, a1)  A¬ϕ by item 3 of Defini-
tion 2 because (d′, a1)  ¬ϕ → A¬ϕ. Thus, by item 5 of
Definition 2, there is a response action a2 ∈ Ad′ of the at-
tacker such that (d′, a2) 1 ¬ϕ. Hence, (d′, a2)  ϕ by item
2 of Definition 2. Then, choose the response action a′ to be
a2 to have (d′, a′)  ϕ.
(⇐) : Suppose that (d, a)  ϕ ∧ ¬N(¬ϕ→ A¬ϕ). Thus,
(d, a)  ϕ (1)
and (d, a) 1 N(¬ϕ → A¬ϕ). The latter, by item 4 of
Definition 2, implies that there is an action d′ ∈ D of the
defender and a response action a′ ∈ Ad′ of the attacker
such that (d′, a′) 1 ¬ϕ → A¬ϕ. Thus, (d′, a′)  ¬ϕ
and (d′, a′) 1 A¬ϕ by item 3 of Definition 2. Then,
(d′, a′′)  ¬ϕ for each response action a′′ ∈ Ad′ of the
attacker, by item 5 of Definition 2. Thus, (d′, a′′) 1 ϕ for
each response action a′′ ∈ Ad′ of the attacker, by item 2
of Definition 2. Hence, there exists an action d′ ∈ D of the
defender such that (d′, a′′) 1 ϕ for each response action
a′′ ∈ Ad′ of the attacker. Therefore, statement (1) implies
(d, a)  Dϕ by item 6 above. 
Axioms
In addition to the propositional tautologies in language Φ,
our logical system contains the following axioms.
1. Truth: ϕ→ ϕ, where ∈ {N,A},
2. Negative Introspection: ¬Nϕ→ N¬Nϕ,
3. Distributivity: N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Nϕ→ Nψ),
4. Unavoidability: Nϕ→ ¬Aϕ,
5. Strict Conditional: N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Aψ → (ϕ→ Aϕ)),
6. Conjunction: A(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (Aϕ ∨ Aψ),
7. No Blame: ¬A(ϕ→ Aϕ).
The Truth (for N), the Negative Introspection, and the
Distributivity axioms are the well known S5 properties of
the necessity modality N. The Truth axiom for modality A
states that the attacker can only be blamed for something
true. The Unavoidability axiom states that the attacker can-
not be blamed for something that could not be prevented.
The Strict Conditional axiom states that if statement ψ is
true under each action profile where ϕ is true, the attacker is
blameable for ψ, and ϕ is true, then the attacker is also blam-
able for ϕ. Indeed, because statement ψ is true under each
action profile where ϕ is true, any action of the attacker that
prevents ψ also prevents ϕ. Hence, if the attacker is blame-
able for ψ and ϕ is true, then the attacker is also blamable
for ϕ. We formalize this argument in Lemma 11.
The Truth axiom, the Unavoidability axiom, and the Strict
Conditional axiom hold not only for modality A, but for
modality D as well. These axioms are also true for strate-
gic games.
The Conjunction and the No Blame axioms are the key ax-
ioms of our logical system. They capture the asymmetry of
information in security games. Both of these axioms are true
for the attacker’s blameworthiness modality A – their sound-
ness is proven in the appendix. However, as Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4 show, they are not true for the defender’s blame-
worthiness modality D in game G2 depicted in Figure 4.
Lemma 2 is an auxiliary statement about game G2 used in
the proofs of these two lemmas.
D
A A
d2d1
a1 a2 a1 a2
p qp,q p
Figure 4: GameG2, where (d1, a1) 1 D(p∧q)→ (Dp∨Dq),
(d2, a2)  D(p→ Dp), and (d2, a1) 1 Ap→ N(p→ Ap).
Lemma 2 (d, a) 1 Dp and (d, a) 1 Dq for each action d
of the defender and each response action a of the attacker in
game G2.
PROOF. Note that (d1, a1)  p and (d2, a1)  p, see
Figure 4. Thus, for each action d′ of the defender there
is an action a′ of the attacker such that (d′, a′)  p.
Hence, (d, a) 1 Dp by item 6 after Definition 2. Similarly,
(d1, a1)  q and (d2, a2)  q imply that (d, a) 1 Dq. 
Lemma 3 (d1, a1) 1 D(p ∧ q)→ (Dp ∨ Dq).
PROOF. By Lemma 2, it suffices to show that
(d1, a1)  D(p ∧ q). Indeed, observe that (d2, a1) 1 p ∧ q
and (d2, a2) 1 p∧ q, see Figure 4. Thus, (d2, a) 1 p∧ q for
each response action a of the attacker on action d2 of the
defender. Also, (d1, a1)  p ∧ q, see Figure 4. Therefore,
(d1, a1)  D(p ∧ q) by item 6 after Definition 2. 
Lemma 4 (d2, a2)  D(p→ Dp).
PROOF. (d1, a1) 1 Dp and (d1, a2) 1 Dp by Lemma 2.
Thus, (d1, a1) 1 p → Dp and (d1, a2) 1 p → Dp by
item 3 of Definition 2 and because (d1, a1)  p and
(d1, a2)  p, see Figure 4. Thus, (d1, a) 1 p → Dp for
each response action a of the attacker on action d of the
defender. At the same time, (d2, a2)  p → Dp by item 3
of Definition 2 because (d2, a2) 1 p, see Figure 4. There-
fore, (d2, a2)  D(p→ Dp) by item 6 after Definition 2.
Informally, the Conjunction and the No Blame axioms
capture the properties of the asymmetry of the information
in security games and thus they cannot be true in strate-
gic games (Naumov and Tao 2019) where the information
is symmetric. A strategic game in which these axioms fail
could be constructed by modifying the security game G2
into a strategic game.
The logical system for blameworthiness in strategic
games (Naumov and Tao 2019) includes the Fairness axiom:
BCϕ → N(ϕ → BCϕ). In the next two lemmas we show
that in the case of security games this axiom is not sound for
modality A, but is sound for modality D.
Lemma 5 (d2, a1) 1 Ap→ N(p→ Ap) in game G2.
PROOF. Note that (d2, a1)  p and (d2, a2) 1 p, see
Figure 4. Thus, (d2, a1)  Ap by item 5 of Definition 2.
Suppose that (d2, a1)  Ap → N(p → Ap). Hence,
(d2, a1)  N(p → Ap) by item 3 of Definition 2. Thus,
(d1, a1)  p → Ap by item 4 of Definition 2. Note that
(d1, a1)  p, see Figure 4. Hence, (d1, a1)  Ap by item
3 of Definition 2. Then, by item 5 of Definition 2, there
must exists a response action a′ ∈ Dd1 of the attacker such
that (d1, a′) 1 p. However, such an action a′ does not exist
because (d1, a1)  p and (d1, a2)  p, see Figure 4. 
Lemma 6 (d, a)  Dϕ → N(ϕ → Dϕ) for any for-
mula ϕ ∈ Φ+, any defender’s action d ∈ D, and any at-
tacker’s response action a ∈ Ad in an arbitrary security
game (D, {Ad}d∈D, pi).
PROOF. Suppose that (d, a) 1 Dϕ → N(ϕ → Dϕ). Thus,
(d, a)  Dϕ and (d, a) 1 N(ϕ → Dϕ) by item 3 of Defini-
tion 2. By item 6 after Definition 2, statement (d, a)  Dϕ,
implies that (d, a)  ϕ.
By item 4 of Definition 2, statement (d, a) 1 N(ϕ→ Dϕ)
implies that there is an action d1 ∈ D of the defender and
a response action a1 ∈ Ad1 of the attacker such that
(d1, a1) 1 ϕ→ Dϕ. Thus, (d1, a1)  ϕ and (d1, a1) 1 Dϕ
by item 3 of Definition 2. Hence, by item 6 after Def-
inition 2, for each action d′ ∈ D of the defender there
is a response action a′ ∈ Ad′ of the attacker such that
(d′, a′)  ϕ. Then, (d, a) 1 Dϕ by item 6 after Definition 2
because (d, a)  ϕ, which is a contradiction. 
We write ` ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms of
our system using the Modus Ponens and the Necessitation
inference rules:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
,
ϕ
Nϕ
.
We write X ` ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the theo-
rems of our logical system and an additional set of axioms
X using only the Modus Ponens inference rule.
We conclude this section with an example of a formal
proof in our logical system. The lemma below is used later
in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 7 If ` ϕ↔ ψ, then ` Aϕ→ Aψ.
PROOF. By the Strict Conditional axiom,
` N(ψ → ϕ)→ (Aϕ→ (ψ → Aψ)).
Assumption ` ϕ ↔ ψ implies ` ψ → ϕ by the laws of
propositional reasoning. Thus, ` N(ψ → ϕ) by the Neces-
sitation inference rule. Hence, by the Modus Ponens rule,
` Aϕ→ (ψ → Aψ).
Thus, by the laws of propositional reasoning,
` (Aϕ→ ψ)→ (Aϕ→ Aψ). (2)
Note that ` Aϕ→ ϕ by the Truth axiom. At the same time,
` ϕ ↔ ψ by the assumption of the lemma. Thus, by the
laws of propositional reasoning, ` Aϕ → ψ. Therefore,
` Aϕ → Aψ by the Modus Ponens inference rule from
statement (2). 
Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of our logical system.
The soundness of the Truth, the Negative Introspection, and
the Distributivity axioms and of the two inference rules is
straightforward. Below we prove the soundness of each of
the remaining axioms as a separate lemma for any action
d ∈ D of the defender, any response action a ∈ Ad of the
attacker of an arbitrary security game (D, {Ad}d∈D, pi) and
any formulae ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ.
Lemma 8 If (d, a)  Nϕ, then (d, a) 1 Aϕ.
PROOF. By item 4 of Definition 2, the assumption
(d, a)  Nϕ implies that (d′, a′)  ϕ for each action d′ ∈ D
of the defender and each response action a′ ∈ Ad′ of the
attacker. In particular, (d, a′)  ϕ for each response action
a′ ∈ Ad of the attacker. Therefore, (d, a) 1 Aϕ by item 5
of Definition 2. 
Lemma 9 If (d, a)  A(ϕ ∧ ψ), then either (d, a)  Aϕ or
(d, a)  Aψ.
PROOF. By item 5 of Definition 2, the assumption
(d, a)  A(ϕ ∧ ψ) implies that (d, a)  ϕ ∧ ψ and there
is a response action a′ ∈ Ad of the attacker such that
(d, a′) 1 ϕ ∧ ψ. Hence, either (d, a′) 1 ϕ or (d, a′) 1 ψ.
Without loss of generality, suppose that (d, a′) 1 ϕ. At the
same time, statement (d, a)  ϕ∧ψ implies that (d, a)  ϕ.
Hence, (d, a)  ϕ and (d, a′) 1 ϕ. Therefore, (d, a)  Aϕ
by item 5 of Definition 2. 
Lemma 10 (d, a) 1 A(ϕ→ Aϕ).
PROOF. Suppose that (d, a)  A(ϕ→ Aϕ). Thus, by item 5
of Definition 2,
(d, a)  ϕ→ Aϕ (3)
and there is a response action a′ ∈ Ad of the attacker such
that (d, a′) 1 ϕ → Aϕ. Hence, (d, a′)  ϕ and (d, a′) 1
Aϕ by item 3 of Definition 2. Thus,
(d, a′′)  ϕ (4)
for any response action a′′ ∈ Ad of the attacker, by item 5
of Definition 2. In particular, (d, a)  ϕ. Then, (d, a)  Aϕ
due to statement (3) and item 3 of Definition 2. Thus,
by item 5 of Definition 2, there must exist a response
action b ∈ Ad of the attacker such that (d, b) 1 ϕ, which
contradicts to statement (4). 
Lemma 11 If (d, a)  N(ϕ → ψ), (d, a)  Aψ, and
(d, a)  ϕ, then (d, a)  Aϕ.
PROOF. By item 5 of Definition 2, the assumption
(d, a)  Aψ implies that there is a response action a′ ∈ Ad
of the attacker such that (d, a′) 1 ψ. At the same time,
(d, a′)  ϕ → ψ by item 4 of Definition 2 and the
assumption (d, a)  N(ϕ→ ψ). Hence, (d, a′) 1 ϕ by item
3 of Definition 2. Therefore, (d, a)  Aϕ by the assumption
(d, a)  ϕ and item 5 of Definition 2. 
Completeness
In this section we prove the completeness of our logical sys-
tem in three steps. First, we introduce an auxiliary modality
R as an abbreviation definable through modality A. Next, we
define a canonical security game and prove its basic prop-
erty. Finally, we state and prove the strong completeness the-
orem for our logical system.
Preliminaries
Let Rϕ be an abbreviation for ¬(ϕ → Aϕ). Note that Rϕ
stands for “statement ϕ is true, but the attacker cannot be
blamed for it”. In other words, Rϕmeans that the defender’s
action unavoidably led to ϕ being true. This modality is
not present in (Naumov and Tao 2019). In the context of
STIT logic, but not in the context of security games, a sim-
ilar single-agent modality was studied in (Xu 1998). The
same modality for coalitions was investigated in (Broersen,
Herzig, and Troquard 2009). Below we prove the key prop-
erties of modality R that are used later in the proof of the
completeness.
Lemma 12 ` Nϕ→ Rϕ.
PROOF. By the Unavoidability axiom, ` Nϕ → ¬Aϕ. At
the same time, ` Nϕ → ϕ by the Truth axiom. Hence, by
propositional reasoning, ` Nϕ→ ϕ ∧ ¬Aϕ. Thus, again by
propositional reasoning, ` Nϕ → ¬(ϕ → Aϕ). Therefore,
` Nϕ→ Rϕ by the definition of modality R. 
The next four lemmas show that R is an S5 modality.
Lemma 13 Inference rule
ϕ
Rϕ
is derivable.
PROOF. Suppose that ` ϕ. Thus, ` Nϕ by the Necessitation
inference rule. Therefore, ` Rϕ by Lemma 12 and the
Modus Ponens inference rule. 
Lemma 14 ` Rϕ→ ϕ.
PROOF. Note that formula ¬(ϕ → Aϕ) → ϕ is a proposi-
tional tautology. Thus, ` Rϕ → ϕ by the definition of the
modality R. 
Lemma 15 ` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ Rψ).
PROOF. Note that the following formula is a propositional
tautology
¬((ϕ→ ψ)→ A(ϕ→ ψ))→
(¬(ϕ→ Aϕ)→ (¬A(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Aϕ)).
Thus, it follows from the definition of the modality R that
` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ (¬A(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Aϕ)).
At the same time, formula
(¬A(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Aϕ)→ ¬A((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ)
is a contrapositive of the Conjunction axiom. Thus, by the
laws of propositional reasoning,
` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ ¬A((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ). (5)
Next, note that the following formula is also a propositional
tautology ((ϕ→ ψ)∧ϕ)→ ψ. Hence, by the Necessitation
inference rule, ` N(((ϕ → ψ) ∧ ϕ) → ψ). Thus, by the
Strict Conditional axiom and the Modus Ponens inference
rule,
` Aψ → ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ A((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ)).
Then, by the laws of propositional reasoning,
` ¬A((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ)→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ ¬Aψ).
Hence, by propositional reasoning using statement (5),
` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ ¬Aψ)). (6)
Note that the following formula is a propositional tautology
¬((ϕ→ ψ)→ A(ϕ→ ψ))→
(¬(ϕ→ Aϕ)→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ)).
Thus, it follows from the definition of the modality R that
` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ)). (7)
Then, by propositional reasoning using statement (6),
` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ ¬Aψ). (8)
Additionally, note that ((ϕ → ψ) ∧ ϕ) → ψ is a proposi-
tional tautology. Hence, statement (7) also implies
` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ ψ).
Thus, by propositional reasoning using statement (8),
` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ (ψ ∧ ¬Aψ)).
Again by propositional reasoning,
` R(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rϕ→ ¬(ψ → Aψ)).
Therefore, ` R(ϕ → ψ) → (Rϕ → Rψ) by the definition
of the modality R. 
Lemma 16 ` ¬Rϕ→ R¬Rϕ.
PROOF. Note that ¬¬(ϕ → Aϕ) ↔ (ϕ → Aϕ) is a propo-
sitional tautology. Thus, ` A¬¬(ϕ → Aϕ) → A(ϕ → Aϕ)
by Lemma 7. Hence, ` ¬A(ϕ → Aϕ) → ¬A¬¬(ϕ → Aϕ)
by contraposition. Then, ` ¬A¬¬(ϕ → Aϕ) by the No
Blame Axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule. Thus,
by the laws of propositional reasoning,
` (ϕ→ Aϕ)→ ¬((ϕ→ Aϕ)→ A¬¬(ϕ→ Aϕ)).
Hence, again by the laws of propositional reasoning,
` ¬¬(ϕ→ Aϕ)→ ¬(¬¬(ϕ→ Aϕ)→ A¬¬(ϕ→ Aϕ)).
Recall that Rϕ is an abbreviation for ¬(ϕ→ Aϕ). Then,
` ¬Rϕ→ ¬(¬Rϕ→ A¬Rϕ).
Thus, ` ¬Rϕ→ R¬Rϕ again by the definition of R. 
The next two lemmas capture well known properties of
S5 modalities.
Lemma 17 If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ψ, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `
ψ, where is either modality N or modality R.
PROOF. First, consider the case when is modality N. As-
sumption ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ψ by the deduction lemma implies
that ` ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ). Hence, by the
Necessitation rule, ` N(ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )).
Thus, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens in-
ference rule, ` Nϕ1 → N(ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ). Hence,
Nϕ1 ` N(ϕ2 → . . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . ) again by the Modus
Ponens inference rule. By repeating the previous two steps
(n− 1) more times, Nϕ1, . . . ,Nϕn ` Nψ.
The case when is modality R is similar, but it uses
Lemma 13 instead of the Necessitation inference rule and
Lemma 15 instead of the Distributivity axiom. 
Lemma 18 ` ϕ → ϕ where is either modality
N or modality R.
PROOF. We first consider the case when is modality N.
Formula N¬Nϕ → ¬Nϕ is an instance of the Truth axiom.
Thus, ` Nϕ → ¬N¬Nϕ by contraposition. Hence, taking
into account the following instance of the Negative Intro-
spection axiom: ¬N¬Nϕ→ N¬N¬Nϕ, we have
` Nϕ→ N¬N¬Nϕ. (9)
At the same time, ¬Nϕ → N¬Nϕ is an instance of the
Negative Introspection axiom. Thus, ` ¬N¬Nϕ → Nϕ by
the law of contrapositive in the propositional logic. Hence,
by the Necessitation inference rule, ` N(¬N¬Nϕ → Nϕ).
Thus, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens in-
ference rule, ` N¬N¬Nϕ→ NNϕ. The latter, together with
statement (9), implies the statement of the lemma by propo-
sitional reasoning.
The case when is modality R is similar, but it uses
Lemma 14 instead of the Truth axiom, Lemma 16 instead
of the Negative Introspection axiom, Lemma 13 instead of
the Necessitation inference rule, and Lemma 15 instead of
the Distributivity axiom. 
Canonical Security Game
We define the canonical gameG(X) = (Ω, {Aδ}δ∈Ω, pi) for
each maximal consistent set of formulae X .
Definition 3 Ω is the set of all maximal consistent sets of
formulae such that if ω ∈ Ω, then {ϕ ∈ Φ | Nϕ ∈ X} ⊆ ω.
Definition 4 ω ∼ ω′ if ∀ϕ ∈ Φ (Rϕ ∈ ω ⇔ Rϕ ∈ ω′).
Note that∼ is an equivalence relation on set Ω. The setAδ
of possible responses by the attacker on an action δ ∈ Ω of
the defender is the (nonempty) equivalence class of element
δ with respect to this equivalence relation:
Definition 5 Aδ = [δ].
Thus, each defender’s action δ ∈ Ω and each attacker’s
responses ω ∈ [δ] are maximal consistent sets of formulae.
This is significantly different from (Naumov and Tao 2019),
where actions of all agents are formulae.
Definition 6 pi(p) = {(δ, ω) ∈ Ω× Ω | ω ∈ Aδ, p ∈ ω}.
This concludes the definition of the canonical game G(X).
As usual, at the core of the proof of completeness is a
truth lemma (or an induction lemma), which in our case is
Lemma 23. The next four lemmas are auxiliary statements
used in the induction step of the proof of Lemma 23.
Lemma 19 For any action δ ∈ Ω of the defender, any re-
sponse action ω ∈ [δ] of the attacker, and any formula
Aϕ ∈ ω, we have (i) ϕ ∈ ω and (ii) there is a response
action ω′ ∈ [δ] such that ϕ /∈ ω′.
PROOF. Assumption Aϕ ∈ ω implies that ω ` ϕ by the
Truth axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule. Thus,
ϕ ∈ ω because set ω is maximal. This concludes the proof of
the first statement. To prove the second statement, consider
the set of formulae
Y = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Rψ ∈ ω} ∪ {χ | Nχ ∈ ω}. (10)
Claim 1 Set Y is consistent.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Suppose the opposite. Thus, there are
Rψ1, . . . ,Rψk,Nχ1, . . . ,Nχn ∈ ω (11)
such that ψ1, . . . , ψk, χ1, . . . , χn ` ϕ. Hence, by
Lemma 17, Rψ1, . . . ,Rψk,Rχ1, . . . ,Rχn ` Rϕ. Then,
by Lemma 12 and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
Rψ1, . . . ,Rψk,Nχ1, . . . ,Nχn ` Rϕ. Thus, ω ` Rϕ by
statement (11). Hence, ω ` ¬(ϕ→ Aϕ) by the definition of
the modality R. Then, ω ` ¬Aϕ by the laws of the proposi-
tional reasoning, which contradicts the assumption Aϕ ∈ ω
of the lemma because set ω is consistent. 
Let set ω′ be any maximal consistent extension of set Y .
Then, ¬ϕ ∈ ω′. Thus, ϕ /∈ ω′ because set ω′ is consistent.
Claim 2 ω′ ∈ Ω.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Consider any formula Nχ ∈ X . By
Definition 3, it suffices to show that χ ∈ ω′. Indeed,
assumption Nχ ∈ X implies that X ` NNχ by Lemma 18.
Thus, NNχ ∈ X because set X is maximal. Then, Nχ ∈ ω
by Definition 3 and the assumption ω ∈ [δ] ⊆ Ω of the
lemma. Hence, χ ∈ Y ⊆ ω′ by equation (10) and the choice
of set ω′. 
Claim 3 ω′ ∈ [δ].
PROOF OF CLAIM. Recall that ω ∈ [δ] by the assumption of
the lemma. Thus, by Claim 2, it suffices to show that ω ∼ ω′.
Hence, by Definition 4, it suffices to prove that Rψ ∈ ω iff
Rψ ∈ ω′ for each formula ψ ∈ Φ. If Rψ ∈ ω, then ω ` RRψ
by Lemma 18. Hence, RRψ ∈ ω because set ω is maximal.
Thus, Rψ ∈ Y ⊆ ω′ by equation (10) and the choice of ω′.
Suppose that Rψ /∈ ω. Thus, ω ` R¬Rψ by Lemma 16
and the Modus Ponens inference rule. Hence, R¬Rψ ∈ ω
because set ω is maximal. Thus, ¬Rψ ∈ Y ⊆ ω′ by
equation (10) and the choice of set ω′. Therefore, Rψ /∈ ω′
because set ω′ is consistent. 
This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 20 For any action δ ∈ Ω of the defender, any re-
sponse action ω ∈ [δ] of the attacker, and any formula
ϕ ∈ Φ, if ¬(ϕ→ Aϕ) ∈ ω, then ϕ ∈ ω′ for each ω′ ∈ [δ].
PROOF. Assumption ¬(ϕ → Aϕ) ∈ ω implies Rϕ ∈ ω
by the definition of the modality R. Note that ω ∼ ω′
because ω, ω′ ∈ [δ]. Thus, Rϕ ∈ ω′ by Definition 4. Hence,
ω′ ` ϕ by Lemma 14 and the Modus Ponens inference rule.
Therefore, ϕ ∈ ω′ because set ω′ is maximal. 
Lemma 21 For any actions ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, if Nϕ ∈ ω, then
ϕ ∈ ω′.
PROOF. Suppose that ϕ /∈ ω′. Hence, Nϕ /∈ X by Defini-
tion 3 and the assumption ω′ ∈ Ω. Thus, ¬Nϕ ∈ X because
set X is maximal. Then, X ` N¬Nϕ by the Negative
Introspection axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule.
Hence, N¬Nϕ ∈ X again because set X is maximal. Thus,
¬Nϕ ∈ ω by Definition 3 and the assumption ω ∈ Ω.
Therefore, Nϕ /∈ ω because set ω is consistent. 
Lemma 22 For any action ω ∈ Ω and any formula ¬Nϕ ∈
ω, there is an action ω′ ∈ Ω such that ϕ /∈ ω′.
PROOF. Consider the set of formulae
Y = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Nψ ∈ ω}. (12)
Claim 4 Set Y is consistent.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Suppose the opposite. Thus, there are
formulae
Nψ1, . . . ,Nψn ∈ ω (13)
such that ψ1, . . . , ψn ` ϕ. Hence, Nψ1, . . . ,Nψn ` Nϕ by
Lemma 17. Thus, ω ` Nϕ by the assumption (13), which
contradicts the assumption ¬Nϕ ∈ ω of the lemma because
set ω is consistent. 
Let set ω′ be any maximal consistent extension of set Y .
Then, ¬ϕ ∈ ω′. Thus, ϕ /∈ ω′ because set ω′ is consistent.
Claim 5 ω′ ∈ Ω.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Consider any formula Nψ ∈ X . By
Definition 3, it suffices to show that ψ ∈ ω′. Indeed,
assumption Nψ ∈ X implies that X ` NNψ by Lemma 18.
Thus, NNψ ∈ X because set X is maximal. Then, Nψ ∈ ω
by Definition 3 and the assumption ω ∈ Ω of the lemma.
Therefore, ψ ∈ Y ⊆ ω′ by equation (12) and the choice of
set ω′. 
This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 23 (truth lemma) For each formula ϕ, each ac-
tion of the defender δ ∈ Ω, and each response action ω ∈ [δ]
of the attacker, (δ, ω)  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ω.
PROOF. We prove the lemma by structural induction on for-
mula ϕ. The case when formula ϕ is a propositional vari-
able follows from Definition 2 and Definition 6. The cases
when formula ϕ is a negation or an implication follow from
Definition 2 and the assumption of the maximality and the
consistency of set ω in the standard way.
Suppose that formula ϕ has the form Aψ.
(⇒) : Assume that Aψ /∈ ω. Hence, ω 0 Aψ because set ω
is maximal. We consider the following two cases separately:
Case I: (ψ → Aψ) ∈ ω. Thus, statement ω 0 Aψ implies
ω 0 ψ by the contraposition of the Modus Ponens inference
rule. Hence, ψ 6∈ ω. Then, (δ, ω) 1 ϕ by the induction hy-
pothesis. Therefore, (δ, ω) 1 Aϕ by item 5 of Definition 2.
Case II: (ψ → Aψ) /∈ ω. Hence, ¬(ψ → Aψ) ∈ ω because
set ω is maximal. Thus, ψ ∈ ω′ for each action ω′ ∈ [δ], by
Lemma 20. Then, by the induction hypothesis, (δ, ω′)  ψ
for each response action ω′ ∈ [δ] of the attacker on action
δ ∈ Ω of the defender. Therefore, (δ, ω) 1 Aψ by item 5 of
Definition 2.
(⇐) : Assume that Aψ ∈ ω. Thus, by Lemma 19, we have
(i) ψ ∈ ω and (ii) there is a response action ω′ ∈ [δ] such that
ψ /∈ ω′. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, (i) (δ, ω)  ψ
and (ii) there is a response action ω′ ∈ [δ] of the attacker
such that (δ, ω′) 1 ψ. Therefore, (δ, ω)  Aψ by item 5 of
Definition 2.
Next, assume formula ϕ has the form Nψ.
(⇒) : Let Nψ /∈ ω. Thus, ¬Nψ ∈ ω because set ω is max-
imal. Hence, by Lemma 22, there is an action ω′ ∈ Ω such
that ψ /∈ ω′. Note that ω′ ∈ [ω′] because [ω′] is an equiva-
lence class. Thus, (ω′, ω′) 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Therefore, (δ, ω) 1 Nψ by item 4 of Definition 2.
(⇐) : Suppose that Nψ ∈ ω. Thus, ψ ∈ ω′ for each
action ω′ ∈ Ω by Lemma 21. Hence, by the induction
hypothesis, (δ′, ω′)  ψ for each action δ′ ∈ Ω of
the defender and each response action ω′ ∈ [δ′] of the at-
tacker. Therefore, (δ, ω)  Nψ by item 4 of Definition 2.
Recall that the canonical game G(X) is defined for an
arbitrary maximal consistent set of formulae X .
Lemma 24 X ∈ Ω.
PROOF. Consider any formula Nϕ ∈ X . By Definition 3, it
suffices to show that ϕ ∈ X . Indeed, assumption Nϕ ∈ X
implies X ` ϕ by the Truth axiom and the Modus Ponens
inference rule. Thus, ϕ ∈ X because set X is maximal. 
Strong Completeness Theorem
Theorem 1 If X0 0 ϕ, then there is an action d ∈ D of
the defender and a response action a ∈ Ad of the attacker
in a game (D, {Ad}d∈D, pi) such that (d, a)  χ for each
formula χ ∈ X0 and (d, a) 1 ϕ.
PROOF. Let the set of formulae X ⊆ Φ be any maximal
consistent extension of setX0∪{¬ϕ}. Then,ϕ /∈ X because
set X is consistent.
Consider the canonical game G(X) = (Ω, {Aδ}δ∈Ω, pi).
Then, X ∈ Ω by Lemma 24. Also, X ∈ [X] = AX because
set [X] is an equivalence class and because of Definition 5.
Therefore, (X,X)  χ for each formula χ ∈ X0 ⊆ X and
(X,X) 1 ϕ by Lemma 23. 
Conclusion
In this paper we gave a sound and complete axiomatic sys-
tem that describes the properties of blameworthiness in se-
curity games. A natural next step is to generalize this work
to arbitrary extensive form games. The Conjunction and the
No Blame axioms in this paper are specific to security games
and are not sound for arbitrary extensive form games. As we
have seen in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, these axioms are al-
ready not sound for the player who makes the first move in
a security game. Although these axioms are sound for the
player making the second move in security games, it is not
sound for the second player in an arbitrary extensive form
game. Consider, for example, gameG3 depicted in Figure 5.
In this game, (d1, a2)  A(p ∧ q) because formula p ∧ q is
true under the action profile (d1, a2), but the second player
could have prevented it by using action a1 instead of a2. At
the same time, (d1, a2) 1 Ap∨Aq because the second player
has neither a strategy that would prevent p nor a strategy that
would prevent q. This is a counterexample for the Conjunc-
tion axiom. The game G3 also provides a counterexample
D DAd1
d2 d2
d1
a2
a1
p
q
p,qp,q
Figure 5: GameG3, where (d1, a2) 1 A(p∧q)→ (Ap∨Aq),
and (d1, a1, d1)  A(p→ Ap).
for the No Blame axiom: (d1, a1, d1)  A(p → Ap). In-
deed, (d1, a1, d1)  p → Ap because (d1, a1, d1) 1 p. At
the same time, (d1, a2) 1 p → Ap. Thus, the second player
could have prevented p→ Ap by using a2 instead of a1.
In addition to finding the right set of axioms, proving
a completeness theorem would also require to recover the
structure of the canonical game tree from a maximal consis-
tent set of formulae. Finding the right set of axioms sound
for all extensive form games and proving their completeness
remains an open problem.
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